




Eagle Team NTC LTP

Eagle 7: LTC Egbert

NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER Combat Aviation Trainers





Outline



- **Introduction**
- **Rotation Timeline**
- **RSOI**
- **Force-on-Force**
- **Live Fire**
- **Big 7/FLDP**
- **Trends**



CG's GOALS




- 1. Train hard - BUT SAFE***
- 2. Get better each day...much better by the end of the rotation***
- 3. Maintain equipment, soldiers, ours and DISCIPLINE***
- 4. Maintain a Winning Warrior Spirit***



Rotation Timeline High Intensity Conflict

TYPICAL ROTATION CHART - BCT OPERATIONS




TRAIN THE FORCE



Rotation Timeline SOSO Operation



TYPICAL ROTATION CHART - BCT OPERATIONS





Scenario Development




How Your Scenario is Developed:

- Corps and Division Commanders
- Brigade Commander
- NTC Operations Group Scenario Writers
- Eagle Team

Options Include:

- Deep Attack Scenarios
- Combined Arms Live Fire
- Force-on-Force Operations
- DART/UMARS Operations
- FARP Live-Fire
- Assembly Area Defense

Force on Force



TRAIN THE FORCE



RSOI



- Clear Definition of Cbt Power Build/Glides
- **Functional TOC**
- **Viable Training Plan**
 - Avn Environmental Training
 - **Drivers Environmental Training**
 - **Execute FARP Ops**
 - Mode IV Checks
 - Static Load Training
 - **All required briefings**
 - **Equipment Draw**
 - **Instrumentation**
 - **PCC/PCI (Commo, NBC, FARP)**
- **Bike Lake: Optional Aviation TAA (MUST COORD)**
- **ID Rotational Log Supporters**

TRAIN THE FORCE



RSOI

Environmental

Training

- Clearly ID Task/Condition/Standard---refer to Avn Addendum, Encl 5
- Minimum tasks to be trained outlined in Encl 5
 - Performance Planning
 - Pinnacle/Ridgeline Ops
 - Ext/Int Load Ops
 - Confined Area Ops
 - Unusual Attitude Recovery
 - Limited Vis/Dust Landings/Takeoffs
- Practice landing multiship to FARPs
- Stay away from dry lake beds—especially for slingload ops!

TRAIN THE FORCE



RSOI

Required Briefings



RSOI 1	0900	MILES Coord Mtg	MILES Reps	Bldg 582
	1000	Field Grade Inbrief	XO/S3/SIP/ASO	Bldg 582
	1200	CSS Inbrief	CSS Reps	Bldg 582
	1300	Unit Inbrief	TF Leaders	Bldg 582
RSOI 2	0900	NCO Inbrief	SGTs-AVOVE	Bldg 582
RSOI 3	1300	ASET IV Demo	Aircrews	BLA
	1600	A2C2/Live Fire Brf	Aircrews	Bldg 988

Required Products

30 Days prior to Rotation	-TACSOP, Task Org, METL, Tng Plan
RSOI 1, 1000 (FG Inbrief)	-Aircrew Training Proficiency Man
	-Start Stat Data, RSOI Tng Plan
RSOI 3	-Live Fire Waiver Memo
RSOI 5	-Environmental Tng Certification
	-MILES Weight & Balance Certification

ALL MUST BE SIGNED BY TASK FORCE COMMANDER!

TRAIN THE FORCE



Force on Force



Both BLUFOR and OPFOR Subject to R

- **No MILES---No Play!**
- **No Manual Adjudication**

Airspace

- **Routes/ROZs Outside BCT Boundaries/above Coord Altitude Must be Requested NLT 1000 the Day Prior to ACO**
- **Do NOT Assume Requests Will Be Approved**
- **Have Backup Plan**
- **If ROZ is near FLOT, expect shutdown (for linear)**
- **Aircraft Shootdowns**



Force on Force



- **Lighting**

- See APG for Minimal Lighting Requirements

- Ch1: Min lighting for AH64s is Form Bright,
not Pos Dim

- **Eagle 07 Is Approval Authority for Blackout Ops**

- Submit Request 24 Hours Prior
- Request **MUST** Include Risk Assessment
Signed by Cdr

- **NBC Ops**

- No Simulated CS at NTC

TRAIN THE FORCE



Live Fire



- **Maneuver Live-Fire--Not Gunnery**
 - Table VIII within 12 months
 - LFX within 6 months
- **LOGPACs**
 - Consolidate into no more than 2 serials daily
 - Single vehicle ops must be staff coord, not “I need to visit.....”
- **Body Armor**
 - **Players are required to don BA 1 hour prior to /Defend time unless they are in AVN TAA**
 - **Aircrews & Pax must wear body armor in flight**
 - **Body Armor is synonymous with Flak Vest/Chic Plates**
 - **Requirement includes Contractors**

TRAIN THE FORCE



Live-Fire



- **Personnel Accountability**
 - **100% Required at All Times**
 - **1 soldier in BSA Unaccounted for Stops all Live-Fire in Box**
 - **No one leaves TAA without an OC knowing about it**
- **All personnel are still required to wear personal**



Ammunition Allocation

	<u>AH-64</u>		<u>OH-58D</u>	<u>TBLVI</u>
HELLFIRE	20	20	0	
2.75" RKTS	380		380	
112(OH)/288(AH)				
30MM	7500		0	3600
.50 CAL	0	36000		640

GSAB / ASSLT

7.62 (Door Gunnery): 9,600 Rounds

"FORSCOM AMMO ALLOCATIONS ADDED TO STRAC"

	1	2	3	4	5
<u>Boresight</u> DA Pam 350-38 Aircraft -10 FM 1-140	Not conducted	Not done by all or not conducted to same standard	(indv/crew-served weapons) miles zeroed at the RUBA; cleaned and functions checked; test fired (METT-T); M2 headspace and timing checked. (Aircraft) Initial rocket pod / .50 cal pod boresight complete; (KW) internal boresight complete; (AH-64) internal boresight complete / outfront boresight completed to a known distance	indv/crew served weapons miles zeroed prior to each battle; all aircraft boresights completed and taped; reported to higher headquarters	used moving targets; aircraft boresight tapes reviewed; lessons incorporated into next mission
<u>PCC/PCI</u> Unit SOP Aircraft -10 CTC Quarterly Bulletin 93-4	Not conducted	Did not attain areas in criterion (3); did not attempt to correct deficient areas	Leader designates/inspects PCIs; vehicle load plans inspected/ safe; vehicle PMCS completed/5988Es submitted; aircraft preflights completed; COMSEC/Mode 4 fills loaded; ASE settings correct; proper weapon system configurations on aircraft; commo checks complete; uniform/MOPP are IAW OPORD	Aircraft PCC/PCI conducted day prior; conducted IAW SOP checklists; progress tracked in company CP; reported to higher HQ	deficiencies re-inspected
<u>Class III/V</u> FM 10-67-1 Aircraft -10 FM 1-111 Unit SOP	Unit has no visibility on Class III/V status	Unit has not met one of the above criteria for a (3); insufficient fuel or ammo to accomplish the mission	All aircraft refueled; sufficient aviation fuel on hand/Aqua-glo tests complete; sufficient ammo on hand in FARP/TAA for mission; FARP active, plan for certification, emergency equipment present; armament contact teams present in FARP/TAA; FARP layout supports aviation operations (sufficient points, holding area, proper markings/lighting, appropriate spacing, avoids dusty terrain); FARP sketches completed and disseminated	FARP certified prior to mission; pad rehearsals conducted; ammo broken down to each arming point; FARP sketch distributed at BN OPORD; ammo/fuel handlers cross-trained/available	FARP defense plan established; UBL on hand ammo and fuel forecasted for next mission with plan for delivery
<u>Rehearsal</u> S FM 101-5, FM 3-0, CTC Quarterly Bulletin 93-4, 95-4, 95-11, 98-8, Call Newsletter 91-1, Unit SOP	Not conducted	Did not meet one or more of the criteria for a (3).	Reinforces the task/purpose, scheme of maneuver, scheme of fires, scheme of support; integrates the actions of the subordinate elements using action-reaction-counteraction method; identified enemy's most likely & most dangerous COAs, composition, disposition, and strength; visually depicts graphics, terrain, enemy, and friendly forces; uses appropriate type and technique given available time and resources	Discusses higher intent, maneuver, fires and CSS; 7 Forms of Contact; incorporates attached/OPCON units into rehearsal; subordinates conduct mission oriented battle drill rehearsals	Discussed detailed branch plans and contingencies without wargaming; conducts separate CSS and/or fire support rehearsals
<u>OPORD</u> FM 101-5, FM 1-112, FM 1-113, FM 1-114, FM 1-100	Not conducted	Failure to issue or develop any paragraph or failure to restate essential tasks, task, and purpose	Maximizes available time through use of warning orders and fragmentary orders, a five paragraph order that has been developed through analysis of the higher HQ order; clearly restates the essential tasks (task and purpose); addresses accomplishment of each specified task from the higher HQ order; assigns a task and purpose to each subordinate element, and is based on IPB	OPORD analyzes and discusses implied tasks and briefed on terrain model	analysis of implied tasks and addresses further development of branches and sequels to the base plan
<u>Time Management</u> FM 101-5, CTC QB 97-18, Call Newsletter 95-12	Subordinates given less than 1/2 time. No warning orders issued	Subordinates given less than 2/3 time; warning order but not complete; timeline lacks detail	Warning order issued in a timely manner; timeline developed and published to maximize available time; OPORD issued in a timely manner; subordinates given 2/3 of available time; parallel planning conducted with higher headquarters; companies, teams and aircrews conduct appropriate rehearsals; sufficient time scheduled and published for PCC/PCI	Subordinates given 4/5 of available time from end of OPORD and back-briefs. PCC/PCI scheduled and conducted day prior to mission execution	Plan allows max rehearsals at all levels and conditions
<u>Graphics</u>	No graphics developed or	No refinement; SITEMP not	Graphics developed that support task and purpose, fires, maneuver, and CSS; graphics refined at company/troon	= issues a refined SITEMP; issues a refined DST;	Graphics support branch plans and

TRAIN THE FORCE



FORSCOM LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

- **Also known as “Shaler Card”**
- **Intent is to help leaders “See Themselves” better**
- **Permanent Party O/Cs provide confidential feedback to key leaders based on FM 22-100**



Risk Trends Management/Safety



- Risk Management not integrated into MDMP IAW FM100-14/FM101-5
- Risk Management conducted solely by ASO—in a vacuum
- Both types of risks (tactical/accidental) not mitigated
- Units lack Pre-accident Plan
- FARPs not certified in timely manner
- No A2C2 plan for FARPs/HAs
- 52nd Mech ADC(M) is approval authority for High Risk missions



TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

“Menu For Discussion”



- Mission Planning
- Aviation Maintenance
- Risk Management
- A2C2
- Rehearsals
- CP Operations
- LNO Operations
- Unit/TF Integration
- Gunnery
- Perimeter Security
- NBC Operations
- FARP Upload
- LOGPAC Operations
- TACSOP
- Troop Leading Procedures



Trends

Mission Planning

OBSERVATION: Incomplete Mission Planning Results in Inadequate Task Force Plans

- Commander involvement is minimal
- Minimal staff integration:
 - S2: Intel does not drive maneuver
 - S3: Develops COA in a vacuum
 - FSO: Participates late in the process
 - S1/S4/HHC/FARP/ASO: Not involved in the process at all
- Lack of running staff estimates; Initial Estimate = Final Estimate
- Wargaming is often omitted from the process
- Staffs are unable to conduct MDMP in a time-constrained environment
- WARNOs not issued, causing subordinate units to plan in a vacuum

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Mission Planning



RECOMMENDATION: Conduct Mission Planning IAW FM 101-5

Commanders must provide clear guidance following mission analysis

- Train staff to conduct complete MDMP for all mission planning:
 - Quarterly staff drills to build proficiency at home station include the commander
 - Wargame with an uncooperative enemy--XO officiates
 - Execute all steps of the process despite time-constrained environment at home station
- Have standard briefing products which do not change (Plans SOP)

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Aviation Maintenance



OBSERVATION: Aviation Task Forces Cannot Generate Sufficient Combat Power

- Leaders not familiar with operational requirements for combat power
- Not enough spare parts of the right type deployed to desert environment (rotor blades, windshields, electronics, etc.)
- No formal link to BSA/DSA to expedite parts requests and transportation requirements
- Units develop Preventative Maint. Program *after* deployment

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Aviation Maintenance



RECOMMENDATION: Build an Effective Maintenance Package Prior to Deployment

- Clearly define combat power in terms of aircraft systems
- Deploy with parts package tailored to the operational theater
- Coordinate with LARs prior to deployment for preventative maint. measures based on the theater environmental conditions
- Establish LNOs at the BSA and DSA to expedite parts flow
- Leaders enforce post-flights accomplished to standard

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Risk Management



OBSERVATION: Units Do Not Fully Understand the Risk Management Process IAW FM 100-14

- Units do not identify tactical risks associated with the mission.
- Tactical controls are not implemented as planned
- Units do not conduct AAR's to see if Risk Assessment controls are effective.
- Safety Officer conducts risk management without input from the staff.



Trends

Risk Management



RECOMMENDATION: Integrate the Five-step Risk Management Process IAW FM100-14 Into the Planning, Preparation and Execution of Every Mission

- Identify hazards and tactical risks through IPB refinement at every echelon down to individual crew level
- Ensure the staff and commanders understand how to implement tactical controls. SEAD planning, Terrain Analysis, use of ASE
- Conduct post-mission assessments of controls and adjust for future missions based on feedback received from the aircrews



Trends A2C2



OBSERVATION: Aviation Maneuver and A2C2 Control Measures are not Synchronized with the Ground Maneuver Plan

- Separately planned aviation control measures lead to impaired situational awareness, division of effort and possible fratricide
- Aircrew members execute missions with incomplete BCT maneuver graphics, friendly obstacle plan graphics, fire support plan graphics, and enemy disposition graphics
- Fire Distribution plans are not integrated to maximize air/ground effectiveness in mutually supported Engagement Areas
- Company Level Leaders and Battalion Level Staff



Trends A2C2



RECOMMENDATION: Integrate Aviation into the Ground Tactical Planning Process

- Conduct combined air/ground OPDs at home station on airspace coordination and ACO planning procedures
- Integrate aviation planners, LNO's and leaders into BCT/BN MDMP process and rehearsals for combined air/ground opns.
- Leaders conduct PCI's to ensure aircrews have all BCT graphics, control measures and an understanding of the BCT scheme of maneuver.
- **Coordinate planning for Surface Danger Zone (SDZ) deconfliction**

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends Rehearsals



OBSERVATION: Units Do Not Conduct Effective Mission Rehearsals

- Poorly constructed terrain model does not adequately portray the battlefield
- Often the XO does not drive the rehearsal with use of execution matrix
- Often treated as unit-by-unit backbrief to the Commander
- No movement on terrain model in conjunction with other units
- No discussion of contingencies
- No reference to ground forces or their schemes of maneuver

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends Rehearsals



RECOMMENDATION: Conduct Detailed Rehearsals to Ensure Complete Understanding Among All Subordinate Elements

- Deploy with an adequate terrain model rehearsal kit
- Construct terrain model with key terrain large enough to walk unit through all phases of the mission
- Array key players on the terrain model prior to rehearsing key events--"set for combat"
- XO drives the rehearsal--calls out key times or events; enforces timeline in accordance with the execution matrix

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends Rehearsals



RECOMMENDATION: Conduct Detailed Rehearsals to Ensure Complete Understanding Among All Subordinate Elements

- Ground TF reps move to portray ground scheme of maneuver, even when not directly linked with the aviation fight
- Discuss critical events with action-reaction-counteraction; include branches, sequels, contingencies and communications



Trends CP Operations



OBSERVATION: Aviation Companies do not operate effective Command Posts

- Command post is not adequately manned by key leaders and a trained CP OIC/NCOIC
- Critical information is not recorded and passed to subsequent shifts
- Current friendly and enemy situation battle tracking not conducted
- Fighter management cycles are not tracked in detail, enforced, and accurately communicated to higher headquarters
- Company planning timelines are not posted to synchronize the junior leaders and planning cells toward the Commander's endstate

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends CP Operations



RECOMMENDATION: Organize CPs to effectively manage and track information

- Experienced pilots and platoon leaders must be trained and held responsible for information management in the CP
- Critical mission information must be analyzed and selectively recorded within the Staff Duty Journal Log or posted (RFIs, CCIRs, Critical Events)
- Conduct shift change briefs to pass information
- Track friendly and enemy situation. Post accurately on situation maps (Enemy/Friendly Sit, Obstacles, MCOO, ADA, CSS)
- Clearly post fighter management cycles within



Trends LNO Operations



OBSERVATION: LNOs not adequately trained or qualified to conduct LNO operations at NTC

- Units normally send junior/inexperienced officers to NTC as LNOs
- LNO doesn't understand responsibilities or job requirements
- Key mission products not delivered to unit in a timely fashion.
- Delays in information flow hinder the ability to parallel plan
- Brigades lack understanding capabilities/limitations of subordinate battalions (i.e.. crew rest, maintenance requirements, and employment considerations)
- Inaccurate information (mission products: OPORDS, **TRAIN THE FORCE**)



Trends

LNO Operations



RECOMMENDATION: Ensure LNOs are adequately trained, experienced aviators who have previous experience working with maneuver Brigades

- **Ensure LNO has adequate time to train with maneuver brigades prior to deployment**
- **Involve LNO in MDMP to ensure capabilities and limitations are brought out early in the planning process**
- **Ensure LNO has a working knowledge of battalion and brigade TACSOPs and TTPs**
- **Ensure LNO has adequate abilities to battle track and communicate with brigade and battalions**
- **Early involvement in planning process will ensure products are delivered to battalions in a timely and accurate fashion**

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Unit/TF Integration



OBSERVATION: Attached and OPCON aviation units arrive and operate at the National Training Center without sufficient support or integration

- Separate companies and teams underutilized for tactical and logistics support.
- LNOs are not prepared for combat (vehicle, supplies, commo)
- Avn units and LNOs are not familiar with the higher HQs TACSOP
- Separate Aviation unit TOE equipment communication architecture is ineffective and insufficient
- Air Force weather personnel not present on the battlefield or not “living” with the aviation unit
- Separate aviation units (Medevacs/CH-47s) deploy

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Unit/TF Integration



RECOMMENDATION: Aviation units must be fully supported by and integrated into the higher headquarters

- **Commanders identify and fill aviation logistical and tactical support requirements prior to deployment (i.e. Air Force Weather, Transportation, Maintenance, Commo and Life Support)**
- **All aviation units should participate in higher headquarters deployment IPRs (commanders or their representatives and UMOs)**
- **All slice and/or separate aviation units must be familiar with higher headquarter's SOPs and TACSOPs**
- **Higher headquarters must understand the**

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends Gunnery



OBSERVATION: Gunnery Statistics Are Well Below Advertised PH for HELLFIRE missiles

- About 70% actual hit rate versus 90% advertised
- Out-front and internal boresights often not conducted to standard
- Poor crew coordination
- Weak switchology and application of TADS/FLIR/TIS system capability
- Poor Target ID--Trees and rocks engaged, fratricide incidents
- Crews slow to recognize conditions conducive to backscatter

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends Gunnery



RECOMMENDATION: Increase Training on Basic Gunnery Skills at Home Station

- **Make it SOP to boresight prior to every flight, despite the msn**
- **Conduct quarterly *evaluated* Table V HGST to keep crews proficient on the gunnery basics**
- **Conduct annual Table XII LFXs as part of company EXEVALs**
- **Develop program to evaluate crews in the CMS or review of AVTR footage--emphasize the effects of backscatter and laser obscurants**

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Perimeter Security



OBSERVATION: Aviation Units Do Not Establish Adequate Security of Their TAA

- Soldiers not familiar with TACSOP/TACSOP not followed
- Priorities of work not followed
- Positions not improved daily and positions offer no protection
- No established battle drills for: response to ground attack, indirect fire, or civilians on the battle field
- Rehearsals not conducted (ground attack, casevac etc...)
- No single point of contact for defensive posture and perimeter

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Perimeter Security



RECOMMENDATION: Commanders Must emphasize Priorities of Work and Secure The Perimeter IAW the Unit's SOP

- Enforce priorities of work - Establish interlocking fire before fighting position improvement
- Conduct rehearsals (ground attack, casevac, COB, QRF etc...)
- Requisition/use Class IV materials - barriers, cover, sand bags, limit stakes, concertina wire, etc...)
- Enforce a daily sustainment plan. Validate perimeter fratricide risk assessment daily
- Establish clear C2 with triggers for QRF employment - rehearse both day and night
- Establish one POC with the responsibility to report

the perimeter defensive posture daily to the

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends NBC Operations



OBSERVATION: Units Are Unprepared For Operations in Chemical Environment

- Chemical detection equipment shortages identified after deployment
- Chemical detection equipment not properly checked, employed, or maintained
- No established battle drills for response to chemical threat
- Soldiers unfamiliar with chemical detection and analysis equipment
- Chemical hardening is rarely accomplished
- Chemical Casualty Collection Points are rarely designated
- Units are unprepared to conduct decontamination

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends NBC Operations



RECOMMENDATION: Train Common/Collective NBC Tasks and PCI Equipment

- Include chemical events during all home station FTXs and validate battle drills (initial actions, C2, Chem hardening, NCO checks, CASEVAC, Chemical analysis, decon, unmasking)
- Establish and train NBC decon teams prior to deployment
- NCOs must check soldiers and enforce buddy checks
- Establish a sustainment plan that includes chemical equipment.

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

FARP Upload



OBSERVATION: FARP Upload and Refuel Time Causes Delay in Helicopter Turn Around Time To Execute Mission

- Soldier's unfamiliar with team operations when working with other MOS's (68s, 77Fs, and 55Bs)
- Pad layout, equipment and personnel are disorganized and FARP personnel are not aware of current air mission timelines.
- Soldiers unprepared to receive aircraft and unable to establish day/night team cycle
- Pilots not aware of FARP layout. Maintenance pad, refuel pads, and arrival, departure, and holding areas
- No PCC/PCI prior to Jump FARP departure results

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

FARP Upload



RECOMMENDATION: Include a detailed FARP Battle Drill in TACSOP, Conduct rehearsals and maintain commo with higher.

- Create FARP pad upload and refuel drills. During all unit FTX's, ensure all FARP personnel train together and validate these written SOPs.
- Utilize pad chief concept to organize refuel/rearm operations
- Ensure a FARP sketch is completed and a refuel/upload rehearsal is conducted before missions
- Ensure all Jump FARPs maintain communications 24/7 and are briefed on all current missions

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends TACSOP



OBSERVATION: Soldiers unfamiliar with TACSOP.
TACSOP not used.

- TACSOP not designed for Task Force operations / use with attachments
- TACSOP not available for NCOs or attachments
- TACSOP too large to facilitate use as quick reference guide
- Unit not trained at home station on TACSOP standards
- Medical operations not included in TACSOP
- Battle drills not established for quick response collective tasks (Respond to: Ground threat, Chemical threat, Civilians on the battlefield)

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends TACSOP



RECOMMENDATION: Review Update & Disseminate TACSOP

- Review TACSOP and revise as required to align with current deployment operations
- Create a ground battle book (tactical displacement, force protection, TAA sustainment) pocket-sized for ease of use
- Validate the TACSOP by enforcing TACSOP standards during all FTX's
- Ensure all soldiers and attachments have access to the unit.

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

LOGPAC Operations



OBSERVATION: Poor CSS Coordination and Tracking

- No CSS coordination with higher to affect resupply, i.e. CLI, III, V
- No CSS rehearsal conducted at TF level
- S4 not tracking expenditures or forecasting CLI, III, V
- S4 not tracking maintenance of combat equipment or establishing maintenance priorities
- S4 does not seek command emphasis in order to receive appropriate amounts of individual CLI, III, IV, & V resulting in the unit going “black” and having to request emergency resupply



Trends

LOGPAC Operations



RECOMMENDATION: Revise the TACSOP & establish a system to better track the classes of supply

- Establish a CSS LNO to ensure proper coordination and timely pushes of supply
- Revise TACSOP to reflect a “No lower than” limit on all classes of supplies
- Establish tracking charts for current maintenance statuses of equipment and classes of supplies with 24/48 hour forecasts
- Brief and rehearse how resupply will occur using the five “Ws” technique
- Do not wait for pushes to occur from the BSA - Be

TRAIN THE FORCE



Trends

Troop Leading Procedures



OBSERVATION: Unit Leaders Do Not Follow TLPs
Resulting in minimal detailed planning and late execution

- TLPs are often not practiced IAW FM 7-20 or FM 17-95
- Basic warning orders not issued at all levels.
- Higher HQs uses two-thirds available time for planning and issuing OPORD, leaving subordinate units only one-third of available time to plan, prepare and rehearse.
- Commanders at Company level do not develop detailed timelines for mission planning preparation and execution.
- Improper types of rehearsals selected for time and



Trends

Troop Leading Procedures



RECOMMENDATION: Utilize Troop Leading Procedures for all Planning, Prep and Execution

- Issue WARNORDS IAW FM 101-5, FM 7-20 and FM 17-95 to subordinate units which facilitates parallel planning at the company and platoon level
- Develop timeline in WARNO 1 that ensures that 1/3, 2/3 rule is followed
- Commanders must generate detailed planning, prep and execution timelines addressing all steps of the TLPs.
- All soldiers conduct PCCs; Leaders conduct PCIs
- Select the proper rehearsal for the time and assets available (i.e.: minimal time = Map or backbrief, Maximum time = Full Force Terrain Board)

TRAIN THE FORCE

Summary



- **NTC Provides the Experience to Make Soldiers, Leaders and Units Better!**
- **You will not leave NTC “Trained and Ready” but “Ready to Train”!**
- **You will leave NTC with confidence in yourselves, your leaders, your equipment and your doctrine!**

We Are Your NTC Team!